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1. Introduction
After European Monetary Union (EMU) has successfully started with 12 countries, the next
major task is its enlargement.  While the enlargement of EMU to its EU non-members (Sweden,
Denmark and the UK) is unproblematic for the current members, this is less clear for the expected
enlargement of the EU to Middle and Eastern European countries.  Currently, it seems likely that a
group of as many as ten countries will join the EU in a few years time, given that have been accepted
as members of the European Union (EU).1  The question is whether all of these countries can be
considered sufficiently close in economic structure to join monetary union as well.  This applies not
only to the Maastricht criteria, but to structural features of these countries.
Most of the literature on monetary unification stresses the importance of similarity of economic
structures for the success of a monetary union (see e.g. Fidrmuc and Korhonen 2001).  But this
literature usually takes the economic structure of the countries as given, without taking into account
that economic structures change over time (Frankel and Rose 1998).  This obviously raises the
question when a candidate country might be appropriately reformed to be admitted and willing to join
an existing monetary union.
The timing of enlargement has been addressed in a paper by Martin (1995) who, however,
takes the convergence of the accession economy as given.  He addresses the question when
monetary union with low distortions would admit a converging economy.  Endogenous structural
reforms, in turn, have been analyzed by Ozkan et al. (1997) and Beetsma and Jensen (2003).  In
those papers, the candidate country must decide if to undertake sufficient reform to be admitted to
the union.  The candidate country can gain from joining due to the high level of distortions that results
in relatively high inflation.  Monetary union is a convenient way to solve this problem.  By
construction, in Beetsma and Jensen (2003) the candidate always wants to join, but the present
                                                
1 Estonia, Poland, Hungary, Cyprus, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovak
Republic, and Malta are set to join the EU in May 2004. Bulgaria, Romania are still applicants that
might join later and with Turkey negotiations have not yet been opened.2
members decide unilaterally about admission.  In Ozkan et al. (1997) the candidate has to decide
whether to fulfill the entry criteria.
The present paper aims to bring these various aspects together and extends them in several
ways.  In contrast to the existing literature, it allows for economic distortions in both countries,
because it is by no means an unimportant question what impact a possible enlargement will have on
the course of economic reforms within the monetary union.  Most of the present members of the
monetary union need to carry out structural adjustments themselves and the question is whether these
are speeded up or slowed down by enlargement.  The paper also allows for asymmetric shocks that
constitute a potential reason for the candidate country to remain outside the monetary union, even if
joining would be possible.  Hence, both countries have to agree to enlargement.2
In focusing on the economic reforms interacting with the choice of the monetary regime, the
present paper also significantly qualifies earlier results concerning the interaction between monetary
union and structural reforms.  Calmfors (2001), Sibert (1999) and Sibert and Sutherland (2000) have
argued that labor market reforms are less likely to be pursued by member countries if they interact
with the time-consistency problem.  As the latter is automatically reduced by monetary union, there is
less incentive for a government to implement structural reforms.  This result, however, need not hold
in general.  By introducing reform needs in the present member states as well, it turns out that
monetary union with a high distortion country increases the incentives to implement reforms.  Thus,
enlargement will lead to more reforms in low distortion countries.  This implies that the negative
results of monetary union on structural reform efforts derived earlier have to be qualified.  It also
means that current member states could benefit from an early enlargement of the monetary union.
The paper is structured as follows: The next section presents basic indicators of the state of
structural reforms in the accession countries.  The following section introduces the model and derives
                                                
2 Because even though EMU is an integral part of the acquis communitaire that countries have
to accept when entering the EU, it is rather unlikely that countries can be forced to join, as the
examples of the UK, Denmark and Sweden show. There is always the possibility deliberately not to
fulfill the entry criteria.3
monetary policy decisions in each country (group).  Section 4 determines, depending on the monetary
regime, the amount of structural reforms in the monetary union and the accession country.  Section 5
analyzes under what circumstances the enlargement of the monetary union is possible, and section 6
looks at the alternative of a one sided “hard peg”, such as eurozation.  Section 7 discusses the
limitations of the model and concludes.
2. The Need for Structural Reforms
Compared with the situation from which they started, most of the candidate countries for
enlargement of the EU (and the EMU) have made considerable progress.3  However, as Table 1 and
Figure 1 show, in many respects they are still quite a distance away from the European average; most
clearly with respect to the inflation and budget deficit criteria (Table 1).  More broadly, a summary
index of convergence puts all of the candidates listed here at a position well below the EU average,
which itself masks considerable differences (Figure 1)
While growth of productivity and GDP are, not surprisingly, higher than in the EU, higher
unemployment and larger shares of agriculture and industry in GDP point to the still ongoing process
of structural adjustment, which is also evident from a relatively large public sector.  In particular, the
large share of agriculture in some economies implies large fiscal requirements to subsidize and phase
out this sector over time.  Large current account deficits and external debt suggest that some of the
countries are vulnerable to current account and currency crises.  A weak banking system in addition
suggests potential problems in the future, because there is a considerable amount of non-performing
loans.  It is by now well known that some of these indicators reflect the danger of a large scale
currency and banking crisis (Tornell 1999).  Although tax rates are comparable to Western European
ones or even above those (World Bank 2002), the transition economies also regularly manage to
                                                
3 This is documented in Fischer et al. (1997), European Commission (2000), Deutsche Bank
(2003), World Bank (2002). Continuous monitoring is provided in the EBRD's annual Transition
Report.4
acquire significant fiscal deficits (Svejnar 2002).  One reason for this could be found in insufficiently
effective tax systems and a large underground economy (Burda 1998).
Finally, more qualitative evidence supports the impression that the candidate countries, with a
view to the enlargement, are also beginning to introduce labor market regulations and laws that might
prove problematic with respect to employment.  Many of them are comparable to those in EU
countries (Burda 1998, EBRD 2000).  The OECD (1999) has put some of the further developed
transition economies at a level of labor market regulation even above some of the EU members.
This evidence clearly points to the need of more structural reforms in candidate countries.  It is
particularly striking that the current situation implies further fiscal needs of governments and these will
likely have an influence on monetary policy.  The same applies to high unemployment.  The higher the
structural problems are the more likely it is that these will ultimately lead to an expansive monetary
policy.
However distorted the candidate countries might be, there is considerable evidence that the
current members have a need for structural reforms themselves.  Distortions in the labor market,
mainly held responsible for high unemployment in western European countries, and distortions in
product markets, like excessive regulation, come to mind (see e.g. Siebert 1997).  Thus some of the
current members as well need to provide more efforts in labor markets to realize their economic
potential.  Nevertheless, it still seems that the overall degree of distortions is considerable higher in
some of the candidate countries.5
Table 1: Structural Convergence Indicators (2002, estimated)
EU Bulgaria Czech
Republic
Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia
GDP growth 0.7 4.0 2.2 4.4 3.5 5.5 4.8 1.2 4.3 4.0 2.8
Productivity Growth 0.3 5.4 4.2 4.4 3.2 6.5 7.2 4.5 5.3 3.3 2.5
Unemployment 8.3 17.4 9.2 12.5 5.8 8.0 12.0 17.8 10.5 18.3 11.5
Inflation (CPI) 2.2 6.0 1.8 3.8 5.3 2.3 1.1 2.1 24.0 3.3 7.5
Fiscal Balance (a, c) -1.5 (-3.0) -0.8 -4.1 -0.4 -9.4 -1.8 -1.8 -5.4 -1.1 -1.0 -2.8
Government Debt (a,
c)
62.5 (60.0) 57.3 23.3 5.1 53.3 13.9 28.4 48.0 29.2 34.5 31.0
Cur. Accou. Def. (a) 0.3 -5.1 -5.9 -7.9 -5.5 -8.4 -5.7 -4.3 -4.9 -7.2 0.0
Source: Deutsche Bank (2003), EBRD (1999), Svejnar (2002).
Notes: a) as share of GDP, b) for year 2000, c) data in parenthesis are reference values, d) index by the EBRD.6
3. Monetary Policy with and without Monetary Union
3.1. The Basic Model
Consider two countries, one (labelled H) where the level of structural distortions is relatively
high while the other (L) has relatively low structural distortions.  This captures the presence of strong
asymmetries between the existing monetary union and the candidates for enlargement that section 2
has demonstrated.
Each country has a government that determines the amount of structural reforms implemented
in each period, and a monetary authority that determines the course of monetary policy.  Both interact
with a private sector that rationally forms expectations about the rate of inflation the central bank will
set in response to the economic situation.  The timing in each period is as follows: (i) the amount of
structural reforms is determined, (ii) inflation expectations are formed, (iii) stochastic shocks may
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occurs, (iv) monetary policy is set, and (v) output is determined.  I assume that the governments are
Stackelberg-leader vis-a-vis the central banks, but that they play Nash against each other.
It is assumed that structural reforms are time independent, thus distortions in a period are
influenced by structural reform in that period (see Beetsma and Jensen 2003).  This is not as
unrealistic as it might seem at first sight.  Unemployment benefits, minimum wages or tax rates are
often adjusted by a government on a yearly basis.  Moreover, changes in the governing party might
involve changes in these areas too.  Often, new incoming governments turn back the reforms that the
previous government has implemented.  This has happened in countries in Eastern Europe and also in
countries like Germany or France where, with a change in government, formerly implemented reforms
have been taken back (see e.g. Saint-Paul 1996).  Moreover, modelling persistent reforms would
make no qualitative difference, as discussed in the conclusion.











t s E y e + x + - p - p = i=L,H. (1)
The (log of) potential output is normalized to zero and actual output can be increased through
monetary surprises p p t
i
t
i E - , with p denoting inflation and E the expectations operator.  Output is
affected by a shock common to the present members countries and to candidate countries  t x , and it
is furthermore affected by a country specific exogenous supply shock 
i
t e  that captures the influence
of asymmetric business cycle developments.  All shocks have an expected value of zero, constant
variances, and are uncorrelated.  Lastly,  0 s
i
t < -  denotes the presence of distortions in the
economy.  As indicated above, this could be due to the presence of strong regulation of employment
and production in the economy, a strong presence of government in the economy, or an insufficient8
and distortive tax system.  The higher these distortions are the more is the current output below
potential output.4




t c k s - = i=L,H. (2)
There is a given level of structural distortions k
i
 which can, however, be reduced through
structural reforms c in period t.  Structural reforms are specified very broadly because different
countries have different need for particular structural reforms, depending on their economic situation.
One might therefore best think about the variable 
i
t c  as a vector of policies that can be implemented
to reduce distortions in the economy.
Government preferences are given over an infinite horizon but are identical for each period.
Per period utility (in logs) for the government is







i i = - + + + c h c h c h { }
2 2 2
p g l i=L,H. (3)
The government in each country aims to minimize differences between actual and potential
output and to minimize deviations of inflation from zero.  Structural reforms are (politically) costly
because they hurt certain interest groups or voters.  Although reforms are output increasing,
governments are under pressure from insider labor unions whose members are uncertain about their
individual job expectations.  Even if aggregate output will increase, individual uncertainty about the
consequences of reform can lead to resistance against reform (Fernandez and Rodrik 1991).  The
more reforms are executed the more potential losers there are and the higher the political costs for the
government.
                                                
4 With the assumption that purchasing power parities holds there is no influence from trade on
output because the real exchange rate is constant.9
Finally, G
i
 is the (political or otherwise) gain for country i from extending monetary union, l is
a dummy with l =1 when country H enters the union and l = 0 otherwise.  Depending on the
relative size of the two countries, one might expect that the larger country has less to gain in political
terms than the smaller partner.  Moreover, the two countries have probably different political gains to
expect from enlargement.  Therefore, political gains are country specific.
All other parameters in the utility function are set equal across the countries because I wish to
abstract from gains or losses arising through monetary unification that are simply due to differences in
preferences (see, e.g., Berger et al. 2001).  All governments have the same interest to avoid inflation
and are also equally reluctant to implement structural reforms.  Hence, all aspects discussed below
are due to structural differences between the economies.
3.2. Monetary Policy before and after Monetary Union
The central bank has preferences very similar to those of its government, but without being
particularly interested in the achievement of monetary union, nor being concerned with the
implementation of structural reforms.5  Since the central bank has no influence on structural reforms
or on the decision of enlargement, these factors have no influence on its optimal policy.  Since
conflicts between central bank and government in a given country are not focused upon, I set the
utility weight parameters equal to those of the government.  The period utility of the central bank is





i = - + c h c h { }
2 2
p i=L,H. (4)
                                                
5 Actually, one would expect that central banks place a negative value on the achievement of
monetary union.  Bureaucracy theory at least would suggest that they are interested in maintaining
their independence.  One might also expect that central banks are in favor of reforms because this
reliefs the pressure to reduce unemployment with monetary policy.  I abstract from both
complications.10
Monetary policy is set after the government has decided upon structural reforms and after a
possible shock to the output occurred.  By assumption, the central bank has full control over the rate











- = p i=L,H. (5)
The central bank, if unable to commit to a different policy, will respond to a high degree of
structural distortion with an increase of the rate of inflation and will also partly stabilize the shocks  t x
and et
i.  Given rational expectations, the public will expect inflation of this size so that this systematic
component of monetary policy has no output effect (Barro and Gordon 1983).  Delegating monetary
policy to an independent central banker with different preferences would only lead to more output
fluctuations (Rogoff 1985).  The first best situation could be reached if the government would be able
to set distortions to zero.  This would also solve the structural inflation problem.
In a monetary union, monetary policy is determined by both formerly separated authorities.
The common central bank's per period utility function is assumed to be





H = +j (6)
where the accession country has a weight of  1 £ j .  It is, however, not very likely that the candidate
will receive the same decision power as the current members (Hefeker 2003).
Again, the central bank takes expectations as given when choosing the optimal rate of inflation.


























= p . (7)11
Thus, the common central bank reacts to structural distortions in both countries, where the
relative weight j determines by how much developments in the accession country are taken into
account.
4. Structural Reforms under Autonomy and Monetary Union
The central bank's reaction is taken into account by the government when it determines by how
much structural distortion should be reduced.  The incentive for the government to reduce structural
distortions is twofold.  It would increase output directly and it would reduce the central bank's
incentive to increase output through inflation.  Without the political costs of reform, the government
would therefore abolish distortions completely.  Because of their costs reforms will be limited.
I begin with monetary autonomy in the two countries.  Governments optimize (4) with respect
to ct
























Structural reforms in the two countries are no longer independent in case of monetary union.
Subject to (9), both governments optimize (4) with respect to 
i
t c .  This yields
( ) [ ]
B
k k c
j 2 j i i
i
t
gc + c - b + g b
= , i,j=L,H,  i„j (10)12
with  ( ) ( ) 0 1 / b 1 b
2 L > j + + ” b ,  ( ) ( ) 0 1 / b 1 b
2 2 H > j + j + ” b ,  ( ) 0 1 / b
2 2 > j + j ” c , and
( )( ) 0 B
2 L H > c - b + g b + g ” .  Notice that 
i b > b , and that 
H L b > b if j <1.
This leads to distortions of
( ) { }
j j i i
t k k
B
s c - b + g
g
= , i,j=L,H,  i„j. (11)
Equations (10) and (11) show that the introduction of monetary union creates spillovers
between the two members.  How are economic policy and structural reform in the two countries
affected through monetary union? (All proofs are gathered in the Appendix.)
Result 1:
The extension of monetary union to a high distortion country will induce more reform in the
low distortion country and thus reduce distortions if 
H k  is sufficiently larger than 
L k .  The
impact on the rate of inflation for country i depends on the difference between 
H k  and 
L k
and the size of j .
Result 2:
By entering monetary union, structural reform efforts in the high distortion country will fall
and distortions will increase.  The rate of inflation for the country will fall if its distortions are
sufficiently larger than those in the low distortion country.
The intuition for these results is straightforward.  Because the low distortion country is inflation
averse it wants to avoid that high distortions in the new member country increase common inflation.
To lower the incentives for the common central bank to increase inflation, distortions will be further
reduced.  Therefore, extension of the monetary union leads to even more structural reforms in low
distortion country.  This result reverses that by Calmfors (2000) and Sibert and Sutherland (2000)13
who assumed that one country exhibits no distortions.  Only in that case can symmetric countries
export part of the inflationary consequences of distortions, which leads them to roll back structural
reforms after monetary union.  If, instead, some asymmetric countries import inflationary pressure
they will increase structural reforms to counter this effect.  In that case enlargement has positive
output and employment effects.
The influence of enlargement on inflation is not certain because there are two conflicting
influences on the central bank.  On the one hand, the inclusion of the high distortion country increases
inflationary pressure.  On the other hand, more structural reforms in the other country reduce this
pressure.  The net effect is thus ambiguous depending on the relative influence of the high distortion
country on common monetary policy.  Only if that is sufficiently large will inflation in current member
states increase.  Otherwise, inflation may even be lower than before.
The result for the high distortion country follows the reverse logic of the above argument.
Because for that country inflation is automatically reduced when entering monetary union, incentives
for the government to reduce the structural distortions in the economy fall.  At the same time, the rate
of inflation will decrease because the common central bank cares less for developments in any single
country and because the increased reform efforts in the other member country additionally reduce
pressure on the common central bank.
The strength of these results depends on the relative weight of the high-distortion countryj .  If
the new members have a decision weight of close to zero they do not influence the common monetary
policy and therefore the spillover effects on the current members are zero.6  The question of relative
weight will therefore be of great policy importance and probably trigger a debate about the
appropriate voting weight of accession countries (see Berger 2002, Hefeker 2003).
5. Enlargement of the Monetary Union
5.1. The Governments' Position towards Enlargement
                                                
6 For the effect on the candidate countries in this case, see the section on euroization below.14
I next turn to the question under what conditions it would be optimal for the low distortion
country to admit the other country to the monetary union?  To keep matters simple, I restrict the
considerations of shocks to asymmetric shocks to one country only and set  0 t = x ,  0
L
t = e ,
t
H
t e = e  in what follows.  For the present purpose, it only matters by how much the optimal response
to economic shocks is compromised through monetary union.  If shocks are identical, monetary union
does not distort the optimal response for individual countries.  Problems only arise if asymmetric
shocks occur.
The positive effects from monetary union for the low distortion country are the political gains
from monetary union and the reduction of structural distortions.  While this is clearly beneficial from
an economic point of view, the government will still oppose more reforms because they are politically
costly.  To be able to confirm that there is an incentive for this country to allow enlargement of the
monetary union, it is necessary to show that there are cases in which the government nevertheless
profits from the enlargement of monetary union.
Government utility under monetary autonomy (A) can be computed from using (5) and (9) in
(1) and (1), (5), (8) in (3).  That under monetary unification (MU) follows from (7) and (11) in (1),
and (1), (7) and (10) in (3).  Comparing the utility levels, one has to concentrate on expected values
because of the stochastic shock.  The condition for E u MU E u A t
L
t
L b g b g >  is
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with s e
2 2 = E t .  The interpretation of this condition is straightforward.  On the left side, expressing
the gains from enlarging monetary union, are the political gain G
L
 and the positive effects from more
structural reforms on output.  On the right side the costs of monetary union are collected.  The first
term expresses the potential increase in inflation that is due to the fact that the common central bank15
will take care of the structural distortion in the new member country.  Whether the expression is
overall positive depends on the size of the distortion in that country and by how much this influences




t < , it is however possible
that this term is negative, thus reducing the negative effects from enlargement (cf. Result 1).  The
second term compares this with the central bank reaction under autonomy.  The third term on the
right side denotes the government’s aversion to higher structural reforms, due to the political costs
that it suffers when implementing more reforms.  Finally, the last term expresses the losses from higher
variance due to the shocks to the accession country.
By the same logic, one can compare utility under autonomy and monetary union for H.  The
condition for E u MU E u A t
H
t
H b g b g >  is
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(13)
The high distortion country profits from monetary union because the inflationary response to
distortions in the economy is lower under monetary union (measured in the first two terms on the left
side).  The government also profits because structural reforms are lower and therefore lower political
costs arise (third term on the left side), and because it may realize political gains from the union.
Costs that are connected with monetary union arise from the fact that the idiosyncratic shock is not
stabilized as much as under autonomy and that higher distortions under the monetary union lead to
lower output (measured on the right side).16
5.2. How Likely is Extension?
The interest of the low distortion country in enlargement is that is might increase output through
the reduction of distortions.  If the country, however, is very reform averse, it will probably resist
enlargement.  In contrast, a strong interest in output increases are beneficial for its consent to
enlargement.  Trivially, the country’s willingness to admit a new member to the monetary union is
increasing in the political gain.  It also obvious that the idiosyncratic shock, that implies more variance
in inflation and employment, is negative from that country’s point of view.  The low distortion country,
however, gains from extension of monetary union if the new member’s distortions are high.  Defining
a function wt
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H >0.  This is
because the central bank’s reaction to these distortions induces more reforms in the low distortion
country which will therefore be able to increase its output.
The candidate country benefits mainly because it can relax its reform efforts.  This implies that a
strong resistance against reforms would suggest enlargement.  Contrary to what might be expected it
follows that reform averse governments actually benefit from enlargement once they inside the union.
The candidate also benefits since the structural component of inflation falls; thus a strong inflation
aversion is beneficial for enlargement.  Again, it is obvious that political gains make enlargement more
attractive for the government.  But since monetary union implies that common  monetary policy will
address the idiosyncratic shocks to the country, monetary union is less attractive if these shocks
exhibit a high variance (cf. eq. 13 ).  Moreover, even the high distortion country is affected by
distortions in the current member states because ¶ w ¶ E k t
H L / =
( )( ) ( ) [ ]
2 2 H L H b b k c - + g j + - b b + g   ( )( ) [ ] c - + g + g - b b k
L .  This expression is only positive if
the distortions 
H k  are sufficiently larger than 
L k .  The accession country will thus lose interest in
monetary union the higher the distortions in the low distortion country are.  Because a high value of
L
t s  implies a relatively high rate of inflation, the country could gain less in terms of lower inflation from
entering the union.  In addition, the level of reforms would not fall by much.17
Both countries are hence most likely to agree to the enlargement if idiosyncratic shocks are not
too large and if the distortions in both countries are not above a critical level.  It is further supported if
both partners expect large political gains.  Since extension brings for both of them positive and
negative effects, it is important how large the relative influence of these effects is on utility.  Because
the effects of EMU on distortions, output and inflation have opposite signs for the two countries, an
extension would be agreeable for both if the preference parameters that measure the influence of
these effects on utility have intermediate values.7  Countries that are predominantly focused on
inflation, output or strucutral reforms are likely to resist enlargement more than countries that value
positive and negative effects of enlargement more equally.
6. Eurozation
An alternative to full monetary union that has been adopted recently by some countries is a so-
called “hard peg” in which one country ties its monetary policy credibly to that of another country,
thereby reducing its inflation.  Such hard pegs could be in the form of a currency board or the
introduction of the anchor curreny as a means of payment.  Examples for either regime can be found
in Latin America (Argentina operated a currency board until recently, while Ecuador and Puerto Rico
are dollarized), Asia (Hong Kong’s currency board), and Eastern Europe (in the former category are
Bulgaria and Estonia, in the latter category is Montenegro).
The benefits of such a regime in form of more credibility and a lower probability of speculative
attacks have to be weighed against the forgone possibility to use monetary policy to account for
shocks and the loss of a lender-of-last resort.8  For some of the likely candidates for enlargement of
EU and EMU, it has been argued that the benefits of full eurozation would clearly dominate the costs
                                                
7 Note that the model supposes equal preference parameters.  If they differ between the
countries, it might be easier to find support for enlargement.
8  See, however, Calvo (1999) who argues that this need not be true.  There are ways to retain
the possibility of a lender-of-last resort.18
(Gros 2000).9  Thus, the present section analyzes the effects of such a eurozation on countries
considering to join such an arrangement.  I will only consider the case of a full eurozation because it is
more credible than a currency board (as Argentina has recently demonstrated) and thus directly
comparable to monetary union.  In this case, the situation for the low distortion country is the same as
under monetary autonomy.











The strategic decision of setting structural reforms would now be different because the rate of
inflation is exogenous for the government, thus making it no longer the Stackelberg leader in its
relation with the central bank.  Hence, the government optimizes (3) with respect to 
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t c , subject to

















How do these results compare to monetary autonomy and full membership in the monetary
union?
                                                
9 Euroization is, however, legally not compatible with the Maastricht treaty since it precludes
that conversion rates be set by the Council of Ministers.  For ways around this problem, see Buiter
and Grafe (2002).19
Result 3:
Compared with monetary autonomy, under eurozation reforms efforts will fall and distortions
will increase in the high distortion country.  Inflation will be lower than under monetary
autonomy.  Distortions increase even more than under full membership in the monetary union.
The logic for this result is the following.  Inflation will fall when monetary policy is tied to the
low distortions country; this implies that structural reform efforts fall.  They fall even more than under
the monetary union because in this case the government has no influence on the rate of inflation, and
therefore no incentive to keep inflation low by implementing reforms.
When deciding whether full membership or eurozation is preferable, the government has to
weigh several effects.  The benefit of eurozation is that it brings an even lower rate of inflation and
even less structural reforms, which is politically attractive.  The costs of this regime are higher,
however, because output will fall and because there are no political gains from entering a union and
exogenous shock are no longer stabilized.
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The condition states that euroization is preferable if the government is averse to inflation and to
structural reforms.  Unless it has a strong aversion against structural reforms and inflation, however, it
is clearly worse off under eurozation, because distortions and output variability increase.  In addition,
it forgoes the political gains from full membership.20
This is obviously different for the anchor country that has to bear no costs at all under such a
regime.  Nevertheless, full membership of the high distortion country would be better for the low
distortion country in as much output would increase due to more structural reforms.  Depending on
the relative weight of output and aversion to reforms, it could then be that full membership is
preferable for both countries.
7. Conclusion
The paper derived the influence of an extension of monetary union on the structural features in
accession countries and on current members.  One could expect that the extension of monetary union
would result in more structural reforms being undertaken within the current member states.  In this
respect, an early extension of EMU to the Middle and Central European countries would be
desirable in terms of necessary structural reforms and add to the expected gains from trade
integration (see Baldwin et al. 1997 on these gains).  As the governments oppose politically costly
structural reforms, this result can be one explanation why the extension of the EU is made conditional
on convergence of the candidates to the member states.  Only then an extension will have little
influence on developments in the current member states.  This might also be one reason why current
members are eager to restrict the influence of accession countries.
By contrast, extension will most likely result in a slowing down of reform efforts in the joining
countries.  But regardless of this being the case, these countries are very likely to gain from extension
in terms of lower inflation.  It is also clear that the gains for these countries from joining are the largest
as long as the structural distortions are high.  Then the gains in credibility and reduction in inflation will
more than outweigh the negative output consequences of a slowdown in economic reforms.  In
addition, political gains are presumably larger in the beginning than later on.  Only if the negative effect
from idiosyncratic shocks is very high, non accession seems more attractive.
These results, stemming from the model applied, may look somewhat counter intuitive initially.
But the logic of the model is more relevant than first impression might suggest.  The main logic that the
model captures is a relation between structural distortions and monetary policy, and that weak21
financial and fiscal systems tend to have higher inflation in order to support fiscal budgets.  Labor
market distortions and high unemployment as well exert pressure on monetary policy that might
simply be due to the fact that distorted labor market are less able to cope with shocks, thus requiring
more stabilizing monetary policy.  Moreover, the model captures the salient feature of the Maastricht
treaty and the entrance criteria to the EMU that suppose a relation between monetary policy and
structural policies.  Otherwise there would be no need for such criteria.
Nevertheless, this is a highly stylized model neglecting some important additional influences on
output such as fiscal policy.  For instance, allowing for persistent reforms would mitigate some of the
results as distortions in both countries would decline over time.  The speed of reform would decline
or accelerate respectively with enlargement, however.  The influence derived here would thus still
apply to further reform efforts.
One possible conclusion from the analysis, that is in contrast to the official EU position, is that
an early extension of monetary union could bring benefits for both groups of countries.  Only a full
monetary union brings benefits to the current members in terms of more structural reforms.
Appendix:
Proof of Result 1: Since the amount of initial distortions is not affected by monetary union, reforms
will directly reduce distortions.  Comparing (11) and (13) shows that the condition for distortions in
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Proof of Result 3:
Follows from a direct comparison of (9) with (16) and of (5) with (14) respectively.  The condition
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References
Baldwin, R. E., J. P. Francois and R. Portes (1997) The Costs and Benefits of Eastern Enlargement:
The Impact on the EU and Central Europe, Economic Policy 24, 125-176.
Barro, R. and D. Gordon (1983) A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model,
Journal of Political Economy 91, 589-610.
Beetsma, R. and H. Jensen (2003) Structural Convergence under Reversible and Irreversible
Monetary Unification, Journal of International Money and Finance 22, 417-439.
Berger, H. (2002) The ECB and Euro-Area Enlargement, IMF Working Paper 02/175.
Berger, H., H. Jensen and G. Schjelderup (2001) To Peg or Not to Peg? A Simple Model of
Exchange Rate Regime Choice in Small Economies, Economics Letters 73, 161-167.
Buiter, W. H. and C. Grafe (2002) Anchor, Float or Abandon Ship: Exchange Rate Regimes for the
Accession Countries, Banca Nazionale Lavoro Quarterly Review, No. 221, 1-32.23
Burda, M. (1998) The Consequences of EU Enlargement for Central and Eastern European Labor
Markets, EIB Papers 3, 65-82.
Calmfors, L. (2001) Labor Market Reform and Monetary Union, Journal of Labor Economics 19,
265-289.
Calvo, G. (1999) On Dollarization, University of Maryland, mimeo.
Deutsche Bank Research (2003) EU Enlargement Monitor No. 10, January, Frankfurt: Deutsche
Bank.
EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) (1999) Transition Report, London:
EBRD.
European Commission (2000) Enlargement Strategy Paper, Brussels: EU-Commission.
Fernandez, R. and D. Rodrik (1991) Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of
Individual-Specific Uncertainty, American Economic Review 81, 1146-1155.
Fidrmuc, J. and I. Korhonen (2001) Similarity of Supply and Demand Shocks Between the Euro
Area and the CEEs, Bank of Finland, BOFIT Discussion Paper 2001/14.
Fischer, S., R. Sahay, C. A. Végh (1997) How Far is Eastern Europe from Brussels?, in H. Siebert,
ed: Quo Vadis Europe?, Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck), 97-122.
Frankel, J. A. and A. K. Rose (1998) The Endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area Criterion,
Economic Journal 108, 1009-1025.
Gros, D. (2000) One Euro from the Atlantic to the Urals? CESifo Forum 2, 26-31, Munich:
CESifo.
Hefeker, C. (2003) Federal Monetary Policy, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, forthcoming.
Martin, P. (1995) Free-Riding, Convergence and Two-Speed Monetary Unification in Europe,
European Economic Review 39, 1345-1364.
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) (1999) Employment Outlook,
Paris: OECD.
Ozkan, F. G., A. Sibert and A. Sutherland (1997) Monetary Union, Entry Conditions and Economic
Reform, CEPR Discussion Paper 1720.24
Rogoff, K. (1985) The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target,
Quarterly Journal of Economics 100, 1169-1190.
Saint-Paul, G. (1996) Exploring the Political Economy of Labour Market Institutions, Economic
Policy 23, 263-315.
Sibert, A. (1999) Monetary Integration and Economic Reform, Economic Journal 109, 78-92.
Sibert, A. and A. Sutherland (2000) Monetary Regimes and Labour Market Reform, Journal of
International Economics 51, 421-435.
Siebert, H. (1997) Labor Market Rigidities: At the Root of Unemployment in Europe, Journal of
Economic Perspectives 11 (Summer), 37-54.
Svejnar, J. (2002) Transition Economies: Performance and Challenges, Journal of Economic
Perspectives 18 (Winter), 3-28.
Tornell, A. (1999) Common Fundamentals in the Tequila and Asian Crises, NBER Working Paper
7139.
World Bank (2002) Transition: The First Ten Years, Washington D.C.: World Bank. 
CESifo Working Paper Series 




994  Louis N. Christofides and Chen Peng, Contract Duration and Indexation in a Period of 
Real and Nominal Uncertainty, July 2003 
 
995  M. Hashem Pesaran, Til Schuermann, Björn-Jakob Treutler, and Scott M. Weiner, 
Macroeconomic Dynamics and Credit Risk: A Global Perspective, July 2003 
 
996  Massimo Bordignon and Sandro Brusco, On Enhanced Cooperation, July 2003 
 
997  David F. Bradford, Addressing the Transfer-Pricing Problem in an Origin-Basis X Tax, 
July 2003 
 
998  Daniel Gros, Who Needs Foreign Banks?, July 2003 
 
999  Wolfram Merzyn and Heinrich W. Ursprung, Voter Support for Privatizing Education: 
Evidence on Self-Interest and Ideology, July 2003 
 
1000 Jo Thori Lind, Fractionalization and the Size of Government, July 2003 
 
1001 Daniel Friedman and Donald Wittman, Litigation with Symmetric Bargaining and Two-
Sided Incomplete Information, July 2003 
 
1002 Matthew Clarke and Sardar M. N. Islam, Health Adjusted GDP (HAGDP) Measures of 
the Relationship Between Economic Growth, Health Outcomes and Social Welfare, July 
2003 
 
1003 Volker Grossmann, Contest for Attention in a Quality-Ladder Model of Endogenous 
Growth, August 2003 
 
1004 Marcel Gérard and Joan Martens Weiner, Cross-Border Loss Offset and Formulary 
Apportionment: How do they affect multijurisdictional firm investment spending and 
interjurisdictional tax competition ?, August 2003 
 
1005 Burkhard Heer, Nonsuperneutrality of Money in the Sidrauski Model with Heterogeous 
Agents, August 2003 
 
1006 V. Anton Muscatelli, Piergiovanna Natale, and Patrizio Tirelli, A Simple and Flexible 
Alternative to the Stability and Growth Pact Deficit Ceilings. Is it at hand?, August 
2003 
 
1007 Reto Foellmi and Josef Zweimüller, Inequality and Economic Growth: European Versus 
U.S. Experiences, August 2003 
 
1008 James S. Costain and Michael Reiter, Business Cycles, Unemployment Insurance, and 
the Calibration of Matching Models, August 2003  
1009 Marco Runkel, Optimal Contest Design when the Designer’s Payoff Depends on 
Competitive Balance, August 2003 
 
1010 Donald O. Parsons, Torben Tranaes and Helene Bie Lilleør, Voluntary Public 
Unemployment Insurance, August 2003 
 
1011 Rüdiger Pethig and Andreas Wagener, Profit Tax Competition and Formula 
Apportionment, August 2003 
 
1012 Johan Willner, Privatisation and Public Ownership in Finland, August 2003 
 
1013 Seppo Kari and Jouko Ylä-Liedenpohja, Taxation and Valuation of International Real 
Investments, August 2003 
 
1014 James Heckman, Rosa Matzkin and Lars Nesheim, Simulation and Estimation of 
Hedonic Models, August 2003 
 
1015 Biswa N. Bhattacharyay, Towards a Macro-Prudential Leading Indicators Framework 
for Monitoring Financial Vulnerability, August 2003 
 
1016 J. Stephen Ferris and Stanley L. Winer, Searching for Keynes: With Application to 
Canada, 1870-2000, August 2003 
 
1017 Massimo Bordignon, Luca Colombo and Umberto Galmarini, Fiscal Federalism and 
Endogenous Lobbies’ Formation, August 2003 
 
1018 Annette Alstadsæter, The Dual Income Tax and Firms’ Income Shifting through the 
Choice of Organizational Form and Real Capital Investments, August 2003 
 
1019 Peter Fredriksson and Bertil Holmlund, Optimal Unemployment Insurance Design: 
Time Limits, Monitoring, or Workfare?, August 2003 
 
1020 Kashif S. Mansori, Following in their Footsteps: Comparing Interest Parity Conditions 
in Central European Economies to the Euro Countries, August 2003 
 
1021 Christoph Borgmann and Matthias Heidler, Demographics and Volatile Social Security 
Wealth: Political Risks of Benefit Rule Changes in Germany, August 2003 
 
1022 Kjell Erik Lommerud, Bjørn Sandvik and Odd Rune Staume, Good Jobs, Bad Jobs and 
Redistribution, August 2003 
 
1023 Patrick Karl O’Brien, The Governance of Globalization: The Political Economy of 
Anglo-American Hegemony, 1793-2003, September 2003 
 
1024 Antonio Ciccone and Giovanni Peri, Skills’ Substitutability and Technological Progress: 
U.S. States 1950-1990, September 2003 
 
1025 Bjørn Sandvik, Optimal Taxation and Normalisations, September 2003 
 1026 Massimo Bordignon and Gilberto Turati, Bailing Out Expectations and Health 
Expenditure in Italy, September 2003 
 
1027 José A. Herce, Namkee Ahn, Ricard Génova, and Joaquín Pereira, Bio-Demographic 
and Health Aspects of Ageing in the EU, September 2003 
 
1028 John Komlos and Marieluise Baur, From the Tallest to (One of) the Fattest: The 
Enigmatic Fate of the American Population in the 20
th Century, September 2003 
 
1029 Stefan Napel and Mika Widgrén, Bargaining and Distribution of Power in the EU’s 
Conciliation Committee, September 2003 
 
1030 Kai Li and Dale J. Poirier, Relationship Between Maternal Behavior During Pregnancy, 
Birth Outcome, and Early Childhood Development: An Exploratory Study, September 
2003 
 
1031 Ivar Ekeland, James J. Heckman, and Lars Nesheim, Identifcation and Estimation of 
Hedonic Models, September 2003 
 
1032 Kjetil Bjorvatn and Alexander W. Cappelen, Decentralization and the Fate of 
Minorities, September 2003 
 
1033 Lars-Erik Borge and Jørn Rattsø, The Relationships Between Costs and User Charges: 
The Case of a Norwegian Utility Service, September 2003 
 
1034 Maureen Were and Nancy N. Nafula, An Assessment of the Impact of HIV/AIDS on 
Economic Growth: The Case of Kenya, September 2003 
 
1035 A. Lans Bovenberg, Tax Policy and Labor Market Performance, September 2003 
 
1036 Peter Birch Sørensen, Neutral Taxation of Shareholder Income: A Norwegian Tax 
Reform Proposal, September 2003 
 
1037 Roberta Dessi and Sheilagh Ogilvie, Social Capital and Collusion: The Case of 
Merchant Guilds, September 2003 
 
1038 Alessandra Casarico and Carlo Devillanova, Capital-skill Complementarity and the 
Redistributive Effects of Social Security Reform, September 2003 
 
1039 Assaf Razin and Efraim Sadka, Privatizing Social Security Under Balanced-Budget   
Constraints: A Political-Economy Approach, September 2003 
 
1040 Michele Moretto, Paolo M. Panteghini, and Carlo Scarpa, Investment Size and Firm’s 
Value under Profit Sharing Regulation, September 2003 
 
1041 A. Lans Bovenberg and Peter Birch Sørensen, Improving the Equity-Efficiency Trade-
off: Mandatory Savings Accounts for Social Insurance, September 2003 
 
1042 Bas van Aarle, Harry Garretsen, and Florence Huart, Transatlantic Monetary and Fiscal 
Policy Interaction, September 2003 
 1043 Jerome L. Stein, Stochastic Optimal Control Modeling of Debt Crises, September 2003 
 
1044 Thomas Stratmann, Tainted Money? Contribution Limits and the Effectiveness of 
Campaign Spending, September 2003 
 
1045 Marianna Grimaldi and Paul De Grauwe, Bubbling and Crashing Exchange Rates, 
September 2003 
 
1046 Assar Lindbeck and Dennis J. Snower, The Firm as a Pool of Factor Complementarities, 
September 2003 
 
1047 Volker Grossmann, Firm Size and Diversification: Asymmetric Multiproduct Firms 
under Cournot Competition, September 2003 
 
1048 Dan Anderberg, Insiders, Outsiders, and the Underground Economy, October 2003 
 
1049 Jose Apesteguia, Steffen Huck and Jörg Oechssler, Imitation – Theory and 
Experimental Evidence, October 2003 
 
1050 G. Abío, G. Mahieu and  C. Patxot, On the Optimality of PAYG Pension Systems in an 
Endogenous Fertility Setting, October 2003 
 
1051 Carlos Fonseca Marinheiro, Output Smoothing in EMU and OECD: Can We Forego 
Government Contribution? A Risk Sharing Approach, October 2003 
 
1052 Olivier Bargain and Nicolas Moreau, Is the Collective Model of Labor Supply Useful 
for Tax Policy Analysis? A Simulation Exercise, October 2003 
 
1053 Michael Artis, Is there a European Business Cycle?, October 2003 
 
1054 Martin R. West and Ludger Wößmann, Which School Systems Sort Weaker Students 
into Smaller Classes? International Evidence, October 2003 
 
1055 Annette Alstadsaeter, Income Tax, Consumption Value of Education, and the Choice of 
Educational Type, October 2003 
 
1056 Ansgar Belke and Ralph Setzer, Exchange Rate Volatility and Employment Growth: 
Empirical Evidence from the CEE Economies, October 2003 
 
1057 Carsten Hefeker, Structural Reforms and the Enlargement of Monetary Union, October 
2003 
 